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Introduction
 As evidence builds that climate change 
poses a threat to human safety and quality of 
life, many countries have begun addressing 
this problem. Wealthy EU countries, in 
particular the UK, have spearheaded programs 
and treaties that attempt to mitigate or adapt 
to climate change. The numerous climate 
change programs the UK has tried, with 
varying success, can serve as a learning tool 
for countries that have been slower to act and 
help the UK hone environmental policy going 
forward. 
 The UK is a world leader in reducing carbon 
emissions, yet there is a growing gap between 
the UK’s legislated goals and its projected 
emissions due to a combination of technical 
and political challenges. The UK needs to 
concentrate on improving efficiency in sectors 
beyond electricity generation, using electricity 
rather than less efficient fuels to power these 
sectors, increasing renewable and nuclear 
generation capacity to meet rising demand, 
and implementing a mixture of technologies, 
from pumped hydroelectrical energy storage 
to smart grids, to balance the fluctuations in 
supply brought on by renewables. Upgrading 
regulations and government programs to focus 
on these targets should provide the necessary 
support to close the gap.
The UK as a Global Leader in 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
 Although other countries have also 
lowered greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
the past decade, the UK became a leader by 
reducing them to a comparatively low level. 
GHG emissions, the de facto measure of 
climate-related pollution, are often simplified 
as carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, as this gas 
dominates GHG footprints (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, “Greenhouse…”). Since 
1990, when GHG emissions from all sectors 
weighed in at 799 equivalent metric tons of 
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The UK has reduced emissions substantially, aiming for an 80% 
decrease in emissions by 2050. However, a changing energy 
generation portfolio, growing electricity demand, and wavering 
political support are forcing the country away from its desired 
emissions trajectory. By focusing on renewables and nuclear power, 
efficiency in sectors such as building and transportation, and 
balance of electricity supply inconsistencies, the UK can meet its 
ambitious targets.
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CO2 (MtCO2e), the country has lowered GHG 
emissions by more than 40% to 466 MtCO2e in 
2016 (“Provisional…”).
 Figure 1 shows the UK’s relative success 
through CO2 emissions, adjusted for economic 
output, compared to countries of varying 
wealth and size. Some countries, such as China, 
have greatly reduced emissions but remain 
large polluters. Others, like France, are the 
lowest emitters but have improved minimally. 
The UK resembles France far more than China 
in its emission history, but in cutting 0.192 kg 
CO2 per dollar of GDP versus France’s 0.096 
reduction, the UK is also improving faster than 
many of its fellow low emitters. Overall, the 
UK emerges as a leader when considering both 
emissions reductions and absolute emissions 
relative to GDP.
 The UK’s climate change goals are 
ambitious. Most countries have minimal 
climate change policies, such as participation 
in the Kyoto Protocol or Paris Agreement. 
Although ratified by an overwhelming number 
of nations, these international agreements fall 
short of obligating the entire globe to binding 
emissions goals (United Nations). The EU goes 
a step further, with binding short-term targets 
and a broad goal of reducing emissions by 80% 
to 95% by 2050 from 1990 levels (European 
Parliament).
 Some ambitious EU countries, notably 
Germany and the UK, have set even more 
demanding 2020 targets than those required by 
the EU. Figure 2 displays various EU countries’ 
1990 emissions levels, their EU 2020 targets, 
their 2014 GHG emissions, and, for the UK and 
Germany, their tighter national 2020 targets. 
 The UK and Germany, with more 
stringent 2020 goals, appear most successful at 
lowering emissions. These two countries have 
Figure 1
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Figure 2 
2020 Targets, and 1990 and 2014  
Absolute Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Select EU Countries
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seen the largest reductions both in absolute 
numbers and compared to 1990 levels. The 
UK’s upfront goals and precursive dedication 
to climate change efforts are closely connected 
to emissions reductions to date.
 Germany provides an interesting 
comparison when trying to understand the 
relationship between self-established goals and 
the UK’s emissions reductions. Both countries 
owe much of their reductions to reducing coal-
powered electricity. Beyond coal, Germany and 
the UK vary greatly in how they have improved. 
Like the UK, Germany relied on reductions 
from the power sector but through a uniquely 
decentralized energy generation structure with 
high municipal and residential ownership. This 
model depends on local banking institutions 
to finance the small-scale renewables that 
abound in Germany. The UK has far less small-
scale generation (Chilvers et al.). Germany 
also decommissioned nearly all nuclear power 
plants prematurely in response to the 2011 
Fukushima accident in Japan. In contrast, 
nuclear power remains important in the UK 
(Renn and Marshall). 
 On the surface the UK and Germany 
have similar emissions histories—both set 
ambitious short-term goals, reduced coal, 
and became two of the lowest GHG emitters 
in the world. However, given their distinct 
approaches, multiple paths are apparently 
feasible. Even so, both cases suggest that clear 
goals and a commitment to low emissions are 
prerequisites.
Successful UK Climate Change Policy 
and Ongoing Challenges
 The Climate Change Act of 2008 is 
integral to the UK’s progressive climate change 
policy. This act legally committed the UK 
16
to reducing carbon emissions by 80% of the 
1990 levels by 2050 (Committee on Climate 
Change, “Carbon…”) and set budgets for five-
year periods in the interim to ensure the UK 
could meet its goal. The act also established 
the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) to 
monitor the UK’s progress. The CCC holds 
power as a reliable, data-driven source on 
cost-effective routes to reducing emissions. 
The CCC proposed the carbon budgets for 
ratification by Parliament, and the agency 
provides expertise on developing issues, such 
as Brexit’s impact on UK climate change 
goals (UK Parliament). Annually, they report 
progress and quantify the expected impact of 
policies on emissions and the economy. For 
example, the CCC estimates the quantity of 
CO2 a program can remove from UK output and 
the cost to both government and consumers. 
These publications also suggest key actions 
which, with government support, could yield 
large reductions. These suggestions often 
highlight funding for research and efficiency 
improvements (Committee on Climate 
Change, “2017…”). Backed by extensive data, 
the CCC is an influential voice on UK climate 
change policy. 
 CCC recommendations often lead to 
the government approving subsidies, funded 
competitions, carbon trading programs, and 
various other policies. UK climate change 
programs aim to correct environmental 
externalities. In other words, the government 
tries to associate environmental degradation 
with costs polluters pay immediately and 
directly so that protecting the environment 
makes economic sense. This concept 
appears in countless ways, from payments to 
households generating renewable energy to a 
vehicle emissions cap with enforceable fines.
 Some aspects of UK climate change 
strategy are EU-wide. Most notable is the 
EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), 
arguably the most effective cap-and-trade 
system worldwide. The ETS sets a limit on 
total emissions and allocates allowances to 
companies. Companies can keep allowances 
to cover their own emissions or sell to others 
with excess emissions. Companies emitting 
more than allowed face steep fines. Over time, 
the cap is lowered, decreasing total emissions 
(European Commission). The UK supplements 
the ETS by removing surplus allowances from 
the market and forcing the price of carbon to 
stay above a specified level, thereby enhancing 
incentives to reduce emissions (Ares and 
Delebarre). Because the ETS is a substantial 
piece of UK climate change policy, Brexit could 
have consequences on emissions progress 
unless the UK can maintain participation in 
the program or successfully replace it with a 
national version.
 Many UK programs rely on positive 
incentives and aim to reduce risk. Consider 
the power sector where the government 
encourages large-scale investment in 
renewables through Contracts for Difference. 
These contracts guarantee low carbon 
generators a consistent “strike price” when 
selling electricity to the grid rather than 
variable market prices. A government-owned 
company pays or receives the difference 
between these prices, making renewables a 
stable, secure investment for companies (UK 
Government). Similarly, the former Feed-in 
Tariffs program supported small generators of 
solar, hydro, anaerobic, micro-heat, and wind 
energies through monthly payments based 
on the technology and quantity of energy 
(Ofgem). This class of policy incentives aims 
to make renewables generation economically 
viable for companies and households.
 With so many positive incentives, the 
UK’s environmental programs are costly. 
The government tries to maximize value, but 
there are limits on spending. Two prematurely 
closed power sector programs exemplify 
this conflict. In 2015, a carbon capture and 
storage competition with a £1 billion funding 
promise was abandoned. The competition 
was in progress for more than four years, 
when the Treasury decided it could not afford 
the offered £1 billion (Carrington). The 
Renewables Obligation program also ended 
before its promised deadline. This program 
required generators to source a percentage of 
energy from renewables, either by generating 
their own or buying Renewables Obligation 
Certificates from an accredited generator. 
Generators who failed to meet their quota 
were charged a fee proportional to their unmet 
obligation. After nearly 15 years, the UK ended 
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the program early to eliminate the operating 
cost (Ofgem). As these examples show, the UK 
has had varying success balancing costs and 
environmental goals.
 Considering the cost to the UK of meeting 
environmental goals, it is natural to wonder 
what compels the country to meet these targets. 
Unlike the EU emissions targets, which carry 
fines, the “legally binding” UK carbon budgets 
lack overt consequences. Nevertheless, 
political and economic implications could be 
substantial. Failure to meet the targets may 
prompt political backlash and impede outside 
investment by disrupting the UK’s image as a 
powerful, innovative nation on climate change 
mitigation. 
 Consider the early 2010s, when 
Parliament wavered over approving the 
fourth carbon budget. Seven global electricity 
technology firms responded by writing the 
Energy Secretary to note that “the UK was 
in danger of undermining its reputation as 
a country with low political risk for energy 
investments” (Lockwood). This same period of 
political uncertainty increased interest rates 
on energy project investment by 15% (Harper). 
When the UK environmental technology 
market appears uncertain, borrowing to fund 
investment becomes more expensive, raising 
the effective price of reducing emissions. 
The UK depends on a green image to limit 
uncertainty and win investors. If the image 
is tarnished, outside funding will decrease, 
so reducing emissions will require additional 
government funding. To maintain private 
investment and keep the cost of climate 
change mitigation low for taxpayers, the UK 
must continue meeting its carbon budgets.
The Developing Landscape  
of UK Climate Change Mitigation
 Despite recent advances, progress has 
slowed. A gap is widening between the UK’s 
trajectory and its ambitious five-year budgets. 
Figure 3 shows legislated carbon budgets, past 
emissions, and anticipated emissions over the 
next 15 years. The two projections indicate 
the range of emissions that could be expected 
given the policies either in place or strongly 
expected to be implemented. It also shows a 
cost-effective route to the 2050 goal of 80% 
reduction advised by the CCC. 
 Although on track to meet and even 
outperform budgets through 2022, by the 
2028–2032 period, projected emissions exceed 
the budget. The gap is small, but the targets 
should be comfortably achievable. Meanwhile, 
the cost-efficient pathway is even lower than 
the budgets themselves. Considering the CCC’s 
desired trajectory, the minor deviation becomes 
the ever larger and concerning policy gap 
highlighted in Figure 3. To close this swelling 
gap and adhere to goals beyond 2022, policy 
and market changes are needed in the UK.
Technical Challenges Decelerating 
UK Emissions Reductions
 The changing makeup of the energy 
sector and a push to substitute electricity for 
higher carbon sources in other sectors, topped 
with the political climate and Brexit-related 
changes to policy, are the main causes of the 
slowdown in reductions. 
 Since the Climate Change Act of 2008, 
emissions due to electricity generation have 
dropped dramatically. The energy sector is 
responsible for 50% of emissions reductions 
between 1990 and 2016, even though it 
accounted for only 30% of the 1990 GHG 
emissions (“Provisional…”). Renewables and 
other technologies provided attainable, cost-
effective means of decreasing carbon output, 
making this outside decrease possible. Coal 
played a key role. The switch from coal to 
greener electricity accounts for 75% of UK 
emissions reductions since 2012. Limiting coal 
has allowed the UK to quickly lower emissions; 
but now, even eliminating coal completely 
would provide less than two years’ worth of the 
emissions reductions needed to stay on target 
(Committee on Climate Change, “2017…”). 
Electricity generation has a new composition: 
natural gas (45%); limited coal (10%); nuclear 
(21%); and growing renewable generation, 
including onshore and offshore wind (12%), 
biomass (9%), hydro (2%), and solar (2%) 
(Committee on Climate Change, “2017…”). 
The new makeup means decreasing coal 
dependence is no longer enough.
 A key component in the UK’s electricity 
portfolio is nuclear power. Nuclear power can 
produce an invariable electricity supply with 
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Figure 3
Past and Projected UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
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relatively low carbon emissions, helping make 
the UK’s energy sector dependable and robust. 
But by 2025, half of the nuclear capacity will 
be decommissioned while only a sixth of the 
capacity will be replaced by new plants by 2030 
(World Nuclear Association), leaving the UK 
with a diminished capacity for low carbon power 
generation. Government action is necessary to 
encourage replacement of this capacity with 
more nuclear or renewable generation.
 Beyond the capacity needed to replace 
decommissioned nuclear power, additional 
generation will be required to meet the 
increasing demand from other sectors. With 
coal nearly eliminated, natural gas is the 
dirtiest of common electricity sources. Because 
natural gas emits fewer tons of CO2 per unit, 
switching to renewables today reduces fewer 
emissions per unit of electricity. 
 Consequently, the cost of subsidizing 
each ton of reduced emissions through onshore 
wind in 2016 was nearly double the 2009 
cost (Renewable Energy Foundation). Even 
considering the US EPA’s maximum estimate 
of the impact to society of each emitted ton 
of CO2, the cost of subsidizing emissions via 
onshore wind would be 50% more than the 
cost to society of not reducing those emissions 
(US Environmental Protection Agency, “The 
Social…”). Other renewable technologies 
are even more expensive; therefore, desired 
reductions likely cannot come from electricity 
generation alone. Decoupling carbon from 
growth in other sectors, such as transportation, 
buildings, and industry, may be more effective. 
 The UK’s next steps involve efficiency, 
from superior insulation that conserves 
heat to efficiency requirements for new cars 
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(Committee on Climate Change, “2017…”). 
Next steps also likely involve raising electricity 
demand. Electricity can be produced with 
limited emissions, so employing electricity 
rather than oil in technologies, such as electric 
vehicles or heat pumps, can lower emissions 
even while increasing electricity demand. 
Combining the impacts of changes in efficiency 
and demand, the CCC estimates electricity 
demand will rise by 7% between 2016 and 
2030. If supplied by renewables, the transition 
would reduce emissions by 62% (Committee 
on Climate Change, “2017…”). 
Political Challenges Compounding 
Deceleration in UK Emissions 
Reductions
 The technical challenges of climate 
change in the UK are compounded by waning 
political support. Political disinterest was 
particularly evident from 2010 to 2015, when 
the government needed to approve the fourth 
carbon budget for 2023–2027. With extensive 
research to justify their suggestion, the CCC 
proposes each target 12 years before the 
budget’s period. However, before the budgets 
become law, Parliament must approve them 
(Committee on Climate Change, “Carbon…”). 
During this process, the fourth budget met 
substantial resistance from conservative 
lawmakers. They raised concerns for a variety 
of reasons: the UK was recovering from a 
financial crisis, lawmakers were satisfied by 
the 2008 Climate Change Act, and the fourth 
budget was the first to extend beyond the 
UK’s obligations to the EU, making it the first 
commitment stricter than those of neighboring 
countries (Lockwood). Additionally, the cost 
to eliminate emissions was rising as coal 
generation dropped. These circumstances 
prompted Parliament to dispute the CCC’s 
recommendations for more than two years 
before finally approving the budget. Sound 
supporting evidence for the CCC’s proposal 
ultimately convinced Parliament to approve 
the fourth carbon budget, but the politics 
surrounding climate change remain lackluster 
in comparison to the enthusiastic commitment 
of 2008. Parliament’s discordance on climate 
change will likely continue impeding progress 
toward the UK’s emission targets.
Objectives for the UK Going Forward
 Combating climate change in the UK is 
more challenging today compared to a decade 
ago, when the 2008 Climate Change Act was 
enacted. Coal-powered generation no longer 
presents an easy target, governmental support 
of environmental measures has waned, and 
electricity demand is predicted to increase 
while generation capacity decreases. The CCC 
presented a reasonable path to continued 
reductions while accounting for these 
pressures. The following advised objectives 
incorporate the CCC’s suggestions together 
with the opinions of other experts.
Improve Beyond the Power Sector 
and Raise Low Carbon Generation 
Capacity
 In the past decade, the ETS has fostered 
reductions in the UK by raising the cost of 
emitting carbon. With Brexit looming, the UK 
may want to negotiate continued participation 
in the international program or implement a 
national version of the ETS. Without a cap-
and-trade system to encourage emissions 
reductions economy-wide, the UK may 
encounter heightened difficulty in reducing 
emissions through the more specific areas, 
discussed as follows.
 Efficiency improvements, primarily in 
buildings, transport, and industry sectors, 
could play an integral role in the UK’s plan 
going forward. Specific, targeted policies, for 
example, the “insulation of all practicable lofts 
by 2022” or a “32% improvement in efficiency 
of conventional cars by 2030” advised by 
the CCC (Committee on Climate Change, 
“2017…”), would drive these changes. The 
benefits are clear: higher efficiency means less 
energy and correspondingly fewer emissions 
to fulfill needs. Although investment is 
required, efficiency is one of the most cost-
effective avenues to lower emissions. Policies 
that support individuals improving efficiency 
in their homes and vehicles or that raise 
efficiency standards in new buildings and 
transport would be a valuable step. Even so, 
efficiency represents only a fraction of the 
changes needed to meet targets.
 Changing the composition of energy 
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sources in sectors such as building, transport, 
and industry may also prove important 
with the power sector holding less potential 
for reductions. Changes will likely include 
using biomethane in the gas grid, increasing 
the proportion of electric vehicles, and 
transitioning home heating from gas to heat 
pumps. These changes would raise electrical 
demand and emissions reductions only realized 
if the new electricity were generated through 
low carbon methods.
 The UK will likely find renewable 
technologies and nuclear power the most 
effective additional low carbon generation 
sources. Onshore and offshore wind generation; 
medium-scale to small-scale hydropower, 
particularly in some areas of Scotland; 
and small-scale solar power are especially 
promising technologies. The CCC has already 
advised the government to expand contracts 
for renewables so supply can meet demand 
from sectors transitioning toward electricity 
(Committee on Climate Change, “2017…”). 
 Simultaneously, nuclear power can 
provide a stable baseload. To maintain a nuclear 
base, the UK would need to invest in nuclear 
projects promptly to enable new plants to be 
operational before aging plants are retired. 
Nuclear is the lowest emitter among reliable 
sources, emitting far less CO2 per unit of 
electricity generated than either coal or natural 
gas (Allen) and making it a reasonable choice 
to supplement renewables and the various 
sources needed to balance renewables. The 
Scottish government and some environmental 
organizations argue that nuclear generation 
carries inherent safety risks and that the UK 
should focus support on cleaner technologies, 
such as offshore wind (Mason and Goodley). 
Even so, nuclear power will likely prove 
worthwhile because, unlike renewables, it can 
provide consistent electricity.
Secure Power with Nuclear, Natural 
Gas, Batteries, and Flexible Demand
 The significant flaw in renewable 
generation is that the technologies are 
sporadic and unreliable. Weather causes 
frequent, substantial fluctuations in the 
quantity of renewably generated energy. 
Consider the efficiency of onshore wind: a 2012 
study demonstrated that in the best cases, 
on average wind farms produce 25% of their 
maximum energy capacity. This efficiency also 
decreases with age to as low as 10% after 16 
years (Hughes). Inadequate electricity supply 
causes power outages, which are aggravating 
and dangerous in cold months, so balancing 
fluctuations in electricity supply is essential. 
 Effective balancing of fluctuations is also 
critical to keeping costs down, as Germany’s 
experience shows. The country rapidly 
increased renewables to provide nearly 27% of 
electricity in 2014, decreasing CO2 emissions 
while lowering the cost of generating and 
transmitting electricity. Yet the direct cost of 
electricity for German households rose due 
to surcharges resulting from the fluctuation 
of renewables (Pollitt and Anaya). Renewables 
would need to be complemented efficiently to 
ensure adequate electricity and minimize costs 
to customers. 
 The UK may find a varied generation 
portfolio effective. Diverse renewable 
technologies and a nuclear baseline could be 
part of a balancing portfolio as well as natural 
gas and batteries that can meet fluctuations 
with a rapid release of electricity to the grid. 
Despite a higher carbon footprint, natural gas 
could complement renewable generation’s 
quick, unexpected dips. Natural gas plants 
can respond quickly to these variations. They 
can be started and reach full load capacity in 
as little as ten minutes. In contrast, lower-
emitting nuclear plants require up to two days 
to reach full capacity (Atlinta Energy). Quick 
adjustment to intermittent renewable output 
is crucial; consequently, a moderate capacity of 
natural gas would be useful.
 Intermittent renewables can be smoothed 
further by batteries, such as hydro-batteries, 
that store energy in high supply/low demand 
times and quickly regenerate the energy at low 
supply/peak demand times. Scottish Power’s 
Cruachan Power Station, a pumped storage 
hydropower station, is one such battery. Built 
into a hollowed mountain, it pumps water from 
the lake at its base to a reservoir partway up the 
mountain when excess electricity is available. 
When electricity supply is insufficient to meet 
demand, water from the elevated reservoir 
is then released, flowing through generators 
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within minutes. The overall process generates 
minimal emissions (Scottish Power). Similar 
batteries could be implemented where possible 
to provide swift response to dips in renewable 
generation or peaks in demand. In short, a 
combination of natural gas and batteries can 
promptly accommodate deviations.
 Further stabilization can be found in 
flexible demand. Flexible demand is effective 
because actions, such as running a washer, 
charging batteries overnight, and heating 
a home, do not need to occur immediately. 
With smarter homes and electrical grids, these 
activities could occur automatically when 
electricity demand is low or when supply is in 
excess. A smart grid is a long-term method of 
matching supply and demand because it does 
not require modifications, such as changes 
in capacity, and it produces fewer emissions 
than natural gas, the predominant method of 
balancing fluctuations today. Incorporating 
this flexibility on the consumer side of the 
electricity market would accommodate a 
higher percentage of renewables in the UK’s 
generating portfolio.
 Unfortunately, converting to a smart 
grid is an enormous infrastructure change 
that calls for investment now. The UK’s 
electrical infrastructure was built primarily 
during the 1950s and 1960s during a rapid 
expansion of electricity. It is aging and 
operating near full capacity (Jenkins et al., 
p. 415). Upgrading the electrical grid will 
be necessary whether through conventional 
expansion or modification to a smart grid, 
and researchers estimated in 2012 that the 
UK could save £19 billion in the long run by 
choosing a smart grid (Easton and Byars). 
The UK began progressing toward a smart 
grid with a requirement that smart meters, a 
necessary first step to overhauling the grid, 
replace conventional meters by 2020. However, 
concerns about privacy and inaccurate billing 
caused pushback until the government 
downgraded the requirement to a suggestion 
(Meadows and Brodbeck). Stricter smart meter 
quality standards may be needed to address 
citizens’ concerns before the government can 
strengthen policies supporting investment in 
the smart grid.
Conclusion
 The UK has made significant environ-
mental strides, setting ambitious goals, 
reducing emissions drastically, and becoming 
a leader in the arena of climate change 
mitigation. Part of this success can be attributed 
to the effectiveness of the CCC, a data-driven 
organization that gives the government updates 
on climate change concerns and suggests 
programs and regulations to help keep the UK 
on track toward an 80% decrease in emissions 
by 2050. Various programs, many of which 
focus on correcting externalities, like the EU 
ETS, or reducing uncertainty to encourage 
investment, such as Contracts for Difference 
and Feed-in Tariffs, have also helped the UK to 
effectively encourage emissions reductions.
 Despite the success, the country’s climate 
change efforts face mounting challenges. 
With coal successfully reduced, more difficult 
methods of reducing emissions are necessary. 
Many nuclear power plants are scheduled to be 
decommissioned over the next decade without 
adequate replacements planned, leaving the 
country with a lower capacity for low carbon 
generation. Simultaneously, the UK will need 
to meet growing demand, growth partially 
caused by sectors beyond power moving toward 
electricity. Meanwhile, government support 
of strong climate change policy has wavered 
over the past five years. Through these rising 
concerns, it is important that the UK continue 
meeting self-set targets to keep uncertainty 
low and encourage outside investment.
 To successfully lower emissions amid 
these challenges, prompt decisive policy with 
the following objectives would be helpful. In 
sectors beyond power, efficiency improvements 
and movement toward electrical power are 
key first steps. The consequent rising demand 
could be met primarily by nuclear power and 
a composite of renewables, including onshore 
and offshore wind, solar, and hydro generation. 
Finally, to balance the inconsistencies 
introduced by a higher ratio of renewables, the 
UK could look to natural gas power to address 
demand when renewables lull for hours to 
days, innovative batteries to provide extremely 
fast response to fluctuations, and a smart grid 
to offset discrepancies from the consumer side 
of the market in the long term.
22
 The UK can meet its ambitious emission 
targets. However, maintaining its position as 
a world leader in combating climate change 
cannot wait five or ten years—it requires 
governmental action today.
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